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Abstract
This paper studies the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous
expectations in a New Keynesian model. The assumption of rational expec-
tations is replaced with parsimonious forecasting models where agents select
between predictors that are underparameterized. In a Misspecification Equilib-
rium agents only select the best-performing statistical models. We demonstrate
that, even when monetary policy rules satisfy the Taylor principle by adjusting
nominal interest rates more than one for one with inflation, there may exist
equilibria with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Under certain conditions, there may
exist multiple misspecification equilibria. We show that these findings have im-
portant implications for business cycle dynamics and for the design of monetary
policy.
JEL Classifications: G12; G14; D82; D83
Key Words: Heterogeneous expectations, monetary policy, multiple equilib-
ria, adaptive learning.
1 Introduction
The monetary policy literature has, for the most part, been developed within the ra-
tional expectations paradigm. One consequence of the assumption of rational expec-
tations is that all agents in the economy hold homogeneous expectations formed with
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respect to the economy’s true probability distribution. Recent studies of the implica-
tions for monetary policy of private agents following adaptive learning rules typically
also maintain the assumption of homogeneity in expectation formation. There is, how-
ever, considerable empirical evidence that agents – households, firms, economists... –
hold heterogeneous beliefs.
This paper focuses on the implications for monetary policy of heterogeneous expec-
tations. To do this we adopt the Misspecification Equilibrium framework of Branch
and Evans (2006, 2007, 2009), itself an extension of Brock and Hommes (1997) to
stochastic environments. Here we apply this approach to the New Keynesian model
by assuming that agents select between forecasting models that differ by their ex-
planatory variables. In the standard New Keynesian model of Woodford (2003),
inflation and the output gap are driven by two exogenous processes corresponding to
“demand” and “price” shocks. In a determinate model, the unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium depends linearly on both demand and price shocks. We instead
assume that agents favor parsimony in their forecasting models and, as a conse-
quence, adopt underparameterized models: agents choose models that forecast the
state based on demand shocks or price shocks, but not both. In a Misspecification
Equilibrium, agents only select the best performing statistical models. In this sense,
although agents hold misspecified beliefs, they will be optimal within the class of
underparameterized models. A Misspecification Equilibrium is “in the spirit” of ra-
tional expectations equilibria by imposing important cross-equation restrictions while
incorporating reasonable assumptions about the manner in which agents form their
expectations.
Our approach is motivated by our earlier findings that even though all agents
optimally select their underparameterized forecasting models, in equilibrium they may
be distributed across all models Branch and Evans (2006) or there may exist multiple
equilibria Branch and Evans (2007), Branch and Evans (2009). Heterogeneity in
beliefs and dispersion in forecasts is an empirical regularity Branch (2004); Kurz
and Motolese (2011). Thus, it is an important issue whether, and to what degree,
monetary policy can affect the diversity of beliefs, and to what extent monetary policy
should respond to this diversity. We assume that monetary policy can be described by
a policy rule that adjusts interest rates in response to the current state of the economy.
We find that, depending on the stochastic properties of the exogenous disturbances,
there may exist multiple misspecification equilibria or equilibria exhibiting Intrinsic
Heterogeneity.
These theoretical findings have several unique implications for business cycle dy-
namics and monetary policy. “Bad luck”, in the form of more volatile and persistent
price shocks, can turn an economy with a unique low volatility equilibrium into one
with multiple equilibria. Real-time learning and dynamic predictor selection in such
an economy will produce endogenous regime-switching volatility of the kind docu-
mented by Sims and Zha (2006), among others. However, if policy becomes increas-
ingly aggressive in responding to inflation, as the Federal Reserve appears to have
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done during the mid 1980’s, the economy will then coordinate on a unique equilibrium.
We also examine the implications of heterogeneous expectations for a policymaker
seeking to implement optimal discretionary policy. When monetary policy is set by
a nominal interest rate rule that responds optimally to private-sector expectations,
there exists a unique misspecification equilibrium. Interest rate rules of this form
have been known to perform well when agents are homogeneous and use least-squares
to update their forecasting models. Our results indicate that expectations-based
policy rules also perform well when agents have heterogeneous expectations, even in
circumstances in which multiple equilibria can arise under simple standard Taylor
rules.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop the New Keynesian model
with diverse beliefs while section 3.1 presents the main analytic results. Section 3.3
presents numerical examples of the number and nature of misspecification equilibria
while section 4 focuses on the business cycle and policy implications of heterogeneity.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 A New Keynesian Model with Diverse Beliefs
We develop our results within the framework of a standard “New Keynesian” model
along the lines of Woodford (2003), where aggregate output and inflation are given
by the following equations
xt = Eˆtxt+1 − ς
(
it − Eˆtpit+1
)
+ gt (1)
pit = βEˆtpit+1 + κxt + ut (2)
where we assume gt = ρgt−1 + εt, ut = φut−1 + νt, 0 < ρ, φ < 1. We allow for gt, ut
to be correlated. Here xt is the aggregate output gap, pit is the inflation rate, and Eˆt
is a convex combination of expectations operators to be specified below. Note that
under rational expectations Eˆ = E.
Equations (1)-(2) constitute a New Keynesian model where conditional expecta-
tions have been replaced by a convex combination of boundedly rational expectations
operators. The model shares the same reduced-form as the homogeneous expecta-
tions version of the New Keynesian model with either rational expectations or adap-
tive learning formulations along the lines of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2003). Branch and McGough (2009) derive these reduced-form equa-
tions from linear approximations to the optimal decision rules of a Yeoman-farmer
economy extended to include two types of agents, ex ante identical except with re-
spect to the manner in which they form expectations. The first equation (1) is an
IS relation that describes the demand side of the economy. In an economy with
homogeneous agents, rational or boundedly rational, it is a linear approximation to
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a representative agent’s Euler equation. With agents heterogeneous in their expec-
tation formation process, equation (1) is obtained by aggregating Euler equations
across agents. The parameter ς is the real interest elasticity of output. Equation
(2) describes the aggregate supply relation. This is obtained by averaging each firms’
pricing decisions, and as in the representative agent economy, κ is the output elasticity
of inflation.
Although equations (1)-(2) share the same reduced-form as a representative agent
economy, the key distinction here is that the diversity of beliefs leads the equilibrium
processes for inflation and output to depend on the distribution of agents’ expecta-
tions. This paper takes as given that these equations govern the economy, and is
interested in the interaction of monetary policy and the equilibrium distribution of
agents across (underparameterized) forecasting models.
2.2 Monetary Policy Rules
A fully specified model prescribes a nominal interest rate rule followed by the central
bank. Throughout this paper we assume that monetary policy is set according to the
nominal interest rate rule
it = χpiEˆtpit + χxEˆtxt (3)
According to this rule, policymakers respond to contemporaneous private sector ex-
pectations. We choose this form for several reasons. First, the robustness of monetary
policies that respond to contemporaneous variables was stressed in Bullard and Mitra
(2002). Second, the true values of pit and xt are not observable at the time policy is set
and thus policies depending on them are not implementable, as argued by McCallum
(1999). The contemporaneous expectations rule (3) was the preferred form in Bullard
and Mitra (2002).
The precise form of the policy rule is actually not critical for the qualitative
theoretical results presented in this paper. For example, we looked at rules where
policymakers set interest rates in response to their own forecasts of contemporaneous
inflation and output gap
it = χpiE˜tpit + χxE˜txt
where it may be the case that E˜ 6= Eˆ. We also looked at rules where they respond
to contemporaneous state variables
it = χpipit + χxxt
which has a form close to the celebrated Taylor-rule, or based on expectations of
future economic variables
it = χpiE˜tpit+1 + χxE˜txt+1
With the latter rule, we examined cases where policymakers have rational expecta-
tions, their own boundedly rational forecasts, or respond to private-sector expecta-
tions. In each instance, the qualitative results are similar. In section 4.3, we also
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consider optimal discretionary policy in which the policy rule depends in part on
Eˆtpit+1 and Eˆtxt+1. The final reason we focus on rules of the form (3) is that they
give a central role to private-sector expectations. This paper’s primary purpose is
to study the joint determination of monetary policy and the distribution of agents’
beliefs. Policy rules of the form (3) deliver the sharpest results.
In each of the policy rules considered, nominal interest rates respond to aggregate
state variables, and thus it is possible to represent the state of the economy in terms
of an aggregate state vector y = (x, pi)′.
2.3 Misspecification Equilibrium
In a minimum state variable rational expectations equilibrium, the law of motion for
the state vector y depends linearly on the exogenous processes for gt, ut. In this paper,
we assume that agents favor parsimony in their forecasting model and instead select
the best performing statistical models from the set of underparameterized forecasting
models. Since there are only two exogenous variables, we assume that private sector
agents underparameterize by selecting from two possible perceived laws of motion:
PLM1 : yt = b
1gt + ηt
PLM2 : yt = b
2ut + ηt
where ηt is a perceived exogenous white noise shock. This implies expectations of the
form,
E1t yt = b
1gt, E
1
t yt+1 = b
1ρgt
E2t yt = b
2ut, E
2
t yt+1 = b
2φut
Let n denote the fraction of agents who use PLM1. Then for any state variable w
Eˆw = nE1w + (1− n)E2w.
Substituting in the diverse beliefs along with the policy rule (3), the system can
be written in the form
yt = AEˆtyt+1 + BEˆtyt +Dzt
where z = (g, u)′ and the expressions for A,B,D are provided in the Appendix.
Plugging in private-sector expectations produces a reduced-form actual law of motion
yt = ξ1(n)gt + ξ2(n)ut (4)
where
ξ1(n) = n (ρA+B) b
1 +De′1
ξ2(n) = (1− n) (φA+ B) b
2 +De′2
and ei, i = 1, 2 is a unit row vector with the ith component equal to one and zeros
elsewhere. In the sequel, we will suppress the dependence of ξj on n.
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Although private-sector agents are assumed to underparameterize their forecasting
models, i.e. to hold restricted perceptions, in equilibrium we require that they forecast
in a statistically optimal manner, in the sense that the forecast model parameters
correspond to optimal linear projections. It follows then that the beliefs bj, j = 1, 2
satisfy the following least-squares orthogonality conditions,
Egt
(
ξ1gt + ξ2ut − b
1gt
)
= 0 (5)
Eut
(
ξ1gt + ξ2ut − b
2ut
)
= 0 (6)
It follows that
b1 = ξ1 + ξ2r
b2 = ξ2 + ξ1r˜
where r = Egtut/Eg
2
t , r˜ = Egtut/Eu
2
t . Least squares orthogonality conditions like
(5) or (6) appear frequently in the macroeconomics literature. For example, Sar-
gent (1999, 2008) define a self-confirming equilibrium with respect to a very similar
condition. Evans and Honkapohja (2001); Sargent (2008) show that many learning
models will converge to a set of parameters that satisfy orthogonality conditions like
(5)-(6) rather than to their rational expectations values. The key feature of beliefs
that satisfy orthogonality conditions like (5) or (6) are that within the context of
their forecasting model, agents are unable to detect their model misspecification.
Combining equations, it is possible to solve for the reduced-form coefficients:[
ξ1
ξ2
]
= △−1
[
De′1
De′2
]
(7)
where
△ =
[
I − n (ρA+ B) −n (ρA+ B) r
−(1− n) (φA+ B) r˜ I − (1− n) (φA+ B)
]
We are now ready to define a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE).
Definition. Given exogenous processes for gt, ut and given the proportion n of agents
using forecast model j = 1, a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium is a stochastic pro-
cess {yt} of the form (4), where the coefficients satisfy (7).
Remark. A unique RPE exists provided △−1 exists.
A general existence result is not available. However the following result holds
for weakly correlated demand and price exogenous shocks and low levels of serial
correlation.
Proposition 1 For values of |r| , |r˜| , |ρ| , |φ| sufficiently small, there exists a unique
RPE for all 0 ≤ n ≤ 1.
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Because the model is self-referential, bj and ξj are objects pinned down by the
equilibrium. Similarly, we do not want to treat n as a free parameter and we now make
it endogenous. Thus, even though agents are assumed to forecast with misspecified
models, there are still important equilibrium restrictions analogous to the restrictions
obtained under fully rational expectations.
In order to determine n endogenously, we need a metric for forecast success. Fol-
lowing Branch and Evans (2007), we assume that agents seek to minimize their fore-
cast mean square error (MSE). Thus, we assume that agents rank their forecasting
model according to
EU j = −E
(
yt+j − E
j
t yt+j
)′
W
(
yt+j − E
jyt+j
)
where W is a weighting matrix, which we set equal to the identity matrix.1 This
is a natural metric since the prediction problem confronting agents, according to
equations (1)-(2), is to form one step ahead forecasts of the output gap and inflation.
Plugging in for private-sector expectations, in an RPE, the actual law of motion
(4), leads to the MSE expressions
EU1 = −E ((ξ2φut − ξ2ρrgt) + ξ1εt+1 + ξ2νt+1)
′W ((ξ2φut − ξ2ρrgt) + ξ1εt+1 + ξ2νt+1)
EU2 = −E ((ξ1ρgt − ξ1φr˜ut) + ξ1εt+1 + ξ2νt+1)
′W ((ξ1ρgt − ξ1φr˜ut) + ξ1εt+1 + ξ2νt+1)
The endogenous value for n is assumed to depend on the relative forecast perfor-
mance. Defining F (n) : [0, 1]→ R as F (n) = EU1−EU2, we can write the expression
for relative forecast performance as
F (n) = Eg2t
[
ρ2
(
ξ′1ξ1 − r
2ξ′2ξ2
)
+ 2ρφ (rξ′2ξ2 − r˜ξ
′
1ξ1) r˜ + φ
2
(
r˜2ξ′1ξ1 − ξ
′
2ξ2
)
Q
]
where Q = Eu2t/Eg
2
t . The relative forecasting performance depends on the distribu-
tion of beliefs because ξ1, ξ2 depend on n.
As in our earlier papers, we follow Brock and Hommes (1997) in assuming a
multinomial logit (MNL) approach to predictor selection. The MNL approach has a
long history in discrete decision making and is a natural way of introducing random-
ness in forecasting into a monetary model. Young (2004) argues that randomness in
forecasting provides robustness against model uncertainty and flexibility in economic
environments with feedback. Since our agents select their predictor from a discrete
set of forecasting models, and are uncertain about which model forecasts best, the
MNL map is natural in this framework:
n =
exp (αEU1)
exp (αEU1) + exp (αEU2)
1Our qualitative results are robust to alternative assumptions about how much relative weight
agents place on inflation or output forecast errors. We note, however, that to remain consistent with
the micro-foundations of the model, the matrix W should be diagonal (c.f. Woodford (2003)), and
thus the identity matrix assumption is a natural choice.
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which can be re-written as
n =
1
2
[tanh {αF (n)}+ 1] ≡ Tα(n). (8)
We remark that T : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a continuous and well-defined function provided
that an RPE exists. The parameter α is called the ‘intensity of choice’. Since the MNL
map derives from a random utility setting, finite values of α parameterize deviations
from full utility maximization. The neoclassical limit arises for α → ∞ in the sense
that in this case all agents select the best-performing statistical model.
In our theoretical results below, we focus on the case of large α, because we are
interested in whether monetary policy can affect the diversity of beliefs when agents
are only subject to the restriction that they forecast with parsimonious models and the
random component of utility is arbitrarily small. Finite values for α may perhaps be
more realistic, but we take the “neoclassical” case as a benchmark and show that with
this strong assumption, heterogeneity across models or across time is a theoretical
possibility. Although the theoretical results restrict attention to the limiting case of
large α, in the numerical section below we illustrate the implications for finite α.
That heterogeneity may arise even when each agent selects the best-performing
model is surprising and was the main result in Branch and Evans (2006). Heterogene-
ity in the large α case can arise because the “best-performing model” is determined
endogenously and depending on the nature of the feedback effect in the model, multi-
ple predictors – each with distinct implications for agents’ forecasts – may fare equally
well within a misspecification equilibrium. Branch and Evans (2006) work with a cob-
web model where there is negative feedback from expectations onto the state. With
negative feedback agents have an incentive to deviate from a consensus forecasting
model and so in equilibrium they will be distributed across diverse forecasting mod-
els. Even though the New Keynesian model has positive feedback the insight of this
paper is that monetary policy that works through an interest rate reaction function
may alter the feedback in such a way that heterogeneity will arise. The results below
illustrate this insight.
It is important to emphasize that the feedback effects in this model – the RPE
parameters, the distribution of agents, and the stochastic process for the state – are
all jointly determined in an equilibrium. We are now ready to define our equilibrium
concept.
Definition. A Misspecification Equilibrium n∗ is a fixed point of the map T : n∗ =
T (n∗).
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3 Results
3.1 Analytic Results
Since the MNL is a monotonic function of the relative predictor fitness measure, it
should be clear from (8) that the number and nature of Misspecification Equilibria
depends on the properties of F (n). Using the arguments of Branch and Evans (2007),
the following proposition characterizes the possible equilibria.
Proposition 2 Let N∗α = {n
∗|n∗ = Tα(n
∗)} denote the set of Misspecification Equi-
libria. In the limit of large α, N∗ has one of the following properties:
1. If F (0) < 0 and F (1) < 0 (Condition P0) then n∗ = 0 ∈ N∗.
2. If F (0) > 0 and F (1) > 0 (Condition P1) then n∗ = 1 ∈ N∗.
3. If F (0) < 0 and F (1) > 0 (Condition PM) then {0, nˆ, 1} ⊂ N∗, where nˆ ∈ (0, 1)
is such that F (nˆ) = 0.
4. If F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 0 (Condition P) then n∗ = nˆ ∈ N∗, where nˆ ∈ (0, 1) is
such that F (nˆ) = 0.
In general, we do not know whether F is monotonic, so we can not rule out the
existence of additional equilibria besides those listed in Proposition 2. When Con-
dition P0 or Condition P1 hold then either n∗ = 0 or n∗ = 1 is a Misspecification
Equilibrium because in those instances agents would always want to select the de-
mand disturbance or supply disturbance model when all other agents do as well. On
the other hand, if Condition P holds then there is an incentive for an individual
agent to deviate from a consensus model and instead Intrinsic Heterogeneity arises.
Under Condition PM it follows that both n∗ = 0 and n∗ = 1 are Misspecification
Equilibria. Thus, Condition PM is a sufficient condition for the existence of multi-
ple equilibria. Under Condition PM there is also an interior equilibrium with agents
distributed across both the demand and supply shock forecasting models. However,
because F (n) is a continuous function, Condition PM implies that whenever F (n) is
monotonic, we have T ′(F (nˆ)) > 1 and hence nˆ is unstable under learning dynamics
of the type we describe below. Under Condition P, whenever F (n) is monotonic then
it crosses through zero from above, and we showed in Branch and Evans (2006) that
a Misspecification Equilibrium with Intrinsic Heterogeneity is stable. Proposition 2
does not state the circumstances under which these conditions will arise. The model
is multivariate and F (0) and F (1) depend in a complicated way on the parameters of
the model. However, it is possible to demonstrate that conditions exist under which
each of the various cases might arise.
Corollary 3 Conditions P0,P1,PM and P can each be satisfied for appropriate choices
of structural parameters.
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By focusing on the special case of weakly correlated demand and supply shocks,
more precise results are available. In particular, the following result provides condi-
tions under which either multiple Misspecification Equilibria or Intrinsic Heterogene-
ity arise. First, though, we define the following expressions:
B0 =
(
ρ2(1− φ2)
φ2(1− ρ2)
)
(1 + κ2) [(1− φ)(1− βφ) + κς(χpi − φ) + ςχx(1− βφ)]
2
ς2(χpi − φ)2 + (ςχx + 1− φ)2
B1 =
(
ρ2(1− φ2)
φ2(1− ρ2)
)
κ2 + (1− βρ)2
[(1− βρ)2(1− ρ) + χxς(1− βρ) + κς(χpi − ρ)]
2
Proposition 4 For r, r˜ sufficiently small we have
1. Condition P0 holds if
σ2ν
σ2ε
> max(B0, B1)
2. Condition P1 holds if
σ2ν
σ2ε
< min(B0, B1)
3. Condition PM holds if
B0 <
σ2ν
σ2ε
< B1
4. Condition P holds if
B1 <
σ2ν
σ2ε
< B0
This result illustrates that either multiple equilibria or Intrinsic Heterogeneity
may arise under many different parameterizations of the model. Since B0, B1 do not
depend on the variances of the exogenous white noise shocks, we are free to choose
the relative ratio of these shocks to satisfy either of these conditions.
Proposition 5 Let r, r˜ be sufficiently small and assume α is large.
1. For χpi and/or χx sufficiently large, depending on
σ2
ν
σ2
ε
, either Condition P holds,
so that there exists a Misspecification Equilibrium with Intrinsic Heterogeneity,
or Condition P0 holds, so that there exists a Misspecification Equilibrium with
n∗ = 0.
2. For σ2ν/σ
2
ε sufficiently large, there exists a Misspecification Equilibrium at n
∗ =
0.
3. For σ2ν/σ
2
ε sufficiently small, there exists a Misspecification Equilibrium at n
∗ =
1.
Remark. In case 1 of Proposition 5 Intrinsic Heterogeneity arises when σ
2
ν
σ2
ε
is less
than a threshold value and n∗ = 0 arises when σ
2
ν
σ2
ε
is greater than the threshold. For
further details, see the Appendix.
10
3.2 Intuition
A simple example helps illustrate the intuition for why different equilibria may arise.
The form of the actual law of motion (4) illustrates that the exogenous disturbances
gt, ut have direct and indirect effects via the feedback from expectations onto the state.
The strength of the indirect effects are controlled by the parameters ς, κ, β, χpi, χx.
The number and nature of Misspecification Equilibria depend on a balancing of these
direct and indirect effects. To illustrate how multiple equilibria or intrinsic hetero-
geneity might arise, take the starkest parameterization of the model: suppose that
demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated (i.e. r = r˜ = 0) and the indirect effects
are weak, i.e. ς = 0, κ = 0, β = 0. Under these assumptions, the model (1)-(2)
becomes
xt = Etxt+1 + gt
pit = ut
Suppose at first that n = 1. The RPE parameters are
ξ1 = (1/(1− ρ), 0)
′
ξ2 = (0, 1)
′
Agents within this RPE will have mean-square forecast errors 1
1−φ2
σ2ν for inflation
and 1
(1−ρ)2
σ2ε for the output gap. Now consider a zero-mass agent deciding whether to
deviate from the consensus and select the supply-shock model instead. Their beliefs,
which satisfy their restricted perceptions orthogonality condition, are b2 = (0, 1)′.
Their forecast errors are thus σ2ν for inflation and
1
(1−ρ)2(1−ρ2)
σ2ε for the output gap.
Whether n = 1 can be a Misspecification Equilibrium depends on whether the zero-
mass agent has an incentive to deviate. That is, n = 1 will be an equilibrium whenever
σ2ν
σ2ε
<
ρ2(1− φ2)
φ2(1− φ2)
1
(1− ρ)2
= B1
Now suppose that the economy is at n = 0. The RPE parameters are
ξ1 = (1, 0)
′
ξ2 = (0, 1)
′
Agents using the supply shock model will have forecast errors for inflation and output
gap of σ2ν ,
1
1−ρ2
σ2ε , respectively. An agent deciding to deviate from the consensus and
forecast based on the demand shock model will have beliefs b1 = (1, 0)′ and forecast
errors for inflation and output gap of 1
1−φ2
σ2ν , σ
2
ε . Thus, n = 0 will be an equilibrium
whenever
σ2ν
σ2ε
>
ρ2(1− φ2)
φ2(1− ρ2)
= B0
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Since B1 > B0 we have condition P0, P1 or PM , depending on the size of σ
2
ν/σ
2
ε ,
and, stable Intrinsic Heterogeneity, i.e. Condition P , cannot arise. However, Intrinsic
Heterogeneity can arise if there is negative feedback, e.g. from policy.
To see this we extend the special case just analyzed to allow for ς, χx > 0. One
can then show that B1 < B0 when
(1− ρ+ ςχx)
2(1− φ+ ςχx)
2 > ς2φ2,
which is satisfied for ςχx sufficiently large. Intrinsic Heterogeneity arises in this case
because of the negative impact on output of a strong policy response to expected
output.
In most New Keynesian models a “Taylor principle” for monetary policy arises:
in an interest rate rule, policy should move nominal rates more than one-for-one
with inflation, i.e. χpi > 1. The intuition behind the Taylor principle is that, by
adjusting nominal interest rates by more than (expected) inflation, monetary policy
will move the real rate in the desired direction. Under rational expectations and
interest-rate rule (3), adhering to the Taylor principle ensures the existence of a
unique rational expectations equilibrium. In the results presented in this paper,
there is no corresponding Taylor principle for Misspecification Equilibria and, in fact,
setting χpi > 1 in some instances may lead to multiple equilibria. A brief extension
of the current example illustrates how policy feedback via χpi affects the number and
nature of equilibria.
Continue to assume that β = κ = r = r˜ = ξx = 0. Now the model consists of the
equations
xt = Etxt+1 − ς(χpiEtpit − Etpit+1) + gt
pit = ut
Recall from above that when χpi = 0, multiple equilibria can arise depending on
σ2ν/σ
2
ε . The question we ask is how values of χpi affect this result. The expression for
B1 is unchanged, but now we have
B0 =
(
ρ2(1− φ2)
φ2(1− ρ2)
)
(1− φ)2
ς2(χpi − φ)2 + (1− φ)2
Thus, χpi > 1 does not necessarily imply a unique misspecification equilibrium. In
fact, adjusting nominal interest rates in response to expected inflation may make
multiple equilibria more likely. In this example, pit = ut and by reacting to ut with
the parameter χpi the effect of ut on xt increases, making an n = 0 equilibrium more
likely to exist; that is, the “supply shock” predictor has greater explanatory power
when policy feeds back on expected inflation.
This example nicely illustrates the equilibria that may arise in a New Keynesian
model with misspecified beliefs. More plausible specifications for the indirect effects,
and in particular the policy effects, lead to a rich set of equilibrium results. The
following section illustrates the role that policy plays in determining the number and
nature of Misspecification Equilibria.
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3.3 Numerical Illustrations
The previous subsection demonstrates the number and nature of Misspecification
Equilibria in a New Keynesian model. To provide further results, this subsection
presents numerical examples. We calibrate the model’s parameters following Wood-
ford (2003) as follows: ς = 1/.157, κ = .024, β = .99. The weight in the forecast
fitness measure W is set to the identity matrix. Policy is assumed to satisfy the
“Taylor principle” which states that nominal interest rates should be raised by more
than one for one with inflation, in the case of a contemporaneous expectations rule the
response coefficient is on expected inflation. In particular, we set χpi = 1.5, χx = .125,
which coincide with Taylor’s original policy rule recommendation in Taylor (1993).
In each example, we fix χx = 0.125. This subsection demonstrates that the model’s
equilibria will vary depending on the properties of the exogenous stochastic processes
for gt, ut.
First, we demonstrate the possibility for multiple equilibria by setting ρ = φ =
0.5, σ2ε = 0.9, σ
2
ν = 0.25, σεν = 0. Figure 1 plots the T-map and relative predictor
fitness measure F (n) for various values of n.
The top panel of Figure 1 plots the T-map while the bottom figure plots the
relative profit fitness measure. Because the function F is monotonic, so is the T-
map. Moreover, the T-map crosses the 45-degree line three times, at n = 0, n = 1
and at a point nˆ where F (nˆ) = 0. Clearly, the interior equilibrium has the property
that T ′(nˆ) > 1 and so this equilibrium would not be attainable under a reasonable
learning rule. However, the equilibria at n = 0 and n = 1 are stable, and so under
this parameterization, with policy satisfying the Taylor principle multiple equilibria
exist.
The results of the previous section, however, suggest that with alternative choices
for the exogenous process governing demand and supply shocks that an equilibrium
exhibiting Intrinsic Heterogeneity, where agents are distributed across all forecasting
models, may exist. To illustrate this, we adopt the same parameter values as in
Figure 1, except now we set φ = .45, σ2ε = .35, σ
2
ν = 0.2. Figure 2 plots the T-map
and relative predictor fitness measure. The bottom panel shows that, under this
particular parameterization, the function F is no longer monotonic, and in particular
it satisfies Condition P where F (0) > 0, F (1) < 0. Under Condition P, equilibria
where agents are all massed onto a particular forecasting model do not exist. The
top panel illustrates that this is the case for these particular demand and price shock
processes. Now the T-map is (monotonically) negatively sloped with a single interior
fixed point. Hence, there is the possibility for diverse beliefs even though agents only
select the best-performing forecasting models.
Figures 1 and 2 show that when policy satisfies the Taylor principle it is possible
to have either multiple equilibria or Intrinsic Heterogeneity. It remains to be seen the
role policy plays in the equilibrium properties of the model. To address this issue we
turn to bifurcation diagrams. We adopt Woodford’s calibration, make assumptions
about the exogenous processes and the policy rule’s response coefficient to output χx,
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and then vary the inflation response coefficient χpi > 0. For each value of χpi ∈ [0, 2],
we calculate the fixed points n∗ = T (n∗), the corresponding unconditional variances
of inflation and the output gap, and plot the results.
The top panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that multiple equilibria exist for all values
of the inflation response coefficient below two. As in Figure 1 there are multiple
equilibria at χpi = 1.5. Although Figure 3 shows the existence of multiple equilibria
for all values of χpi this does not imply that policy does not have an effect on the
dynamic properties of the model. First, the top panel shows that the basins of
attraction for the n = 0 or n = 1 equilibria vary with the policymaker’s inflation
response. If there were a real-time learning dynamic (see below) where agents select
their forecasting model in real-time based on recursive estimates of the relative fitness
of each model, then the size of the basin of attraction to equilibrium n = 1 can be
viewed as the vertical distance between the n = 1 equilibrium and the unstable
interior equilibrium. Clearly, at χpi ≈ 0.5 the size of this basin is maximized. As χpi
increases further above one, the basin of attraction for the n = 1 equilibria shrinks
further and further. We know from Proposition 5 that for sufficiently large χpi there
is an equilibrium at n = 0. So this basin of attraction for n = 1 continues to shrink
until the equilibrium disappears altogether.
The inflation response coefficient also affects the equilibrium variances for the
economy. The bottom two panels plot the unconditional variances of output gap and
inflation, respectively. In the middle panel, the equilibrium variance corresponding to
n = 0 starts off around 30, significantly above the variances for the n = 1 and interior
equilibrium, then approaches the values of the other equilibrium, before increasing
sharply for χpi above one. In the bottom panel, the smaller two variances correspond
to the n = 1 and n = nˆ equilibria, while the higher line corresponds to the “supply
shock” equilibrium n = 0. These two panels demonstrate that for χpi > 0.5 the n = 0
equilibrium has the usual trade-off between inflation and output volatility. Moreover,
it demonstrates that the equilibrium stochastic properties for the economy differ by
equilibrium. Essentially, there is a low volatility n = 1, “demand shock”, equilibrium
and a high volatility n = 0 supply shock equilibrium. These results have important
economic implications that we elaborate on further below.
Figure 4 demonstrates that some parameterizations can lead to a unique equi-
librium with Intrinsic Heterogeneity. Here we adopt the same parameterization as
above except now we set κ = 0.3, σ2ε = 0.45. Now for low values of χpi we see as
in Figure 3 the existence of multiple equilibria: high volatility price shock equilib-
rium and low volatility demand shock equilibrium. However, for moderate inflation
responses, including some that satisfy the Taylor principle, there exists a unique low
volatility demand shock equilibrium. Eventually, for values of χpi > 1.4 the n = 1
equilibrium bifurcates and Intrinsic Heterogeneity becomes the unique equilibrium.
Thus, under this parameterization, the standard Taylor rule coefficients would lead to
diverse beliefs in equilibrium. Eventually, though, as Proposition 5 shows, the price
shock equilibrium emerges as the unique outcome.
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So far we have been focusing on the neoclassical case of α = +∞. This case
is appealing theoretically because all agents select only the best performing models.
However, with finite α heterogeneity becomes a more pervasive feature of the economy,
and there are good reasons to expect that agents will have finite intensities of choice.
Young (2004) argues that a finite α, which one can view as equivalent to having some
randomness in predictor selection, is analogous to mixed strategies in game theory:
with some uncertainty about the appropriate model agents can benefit by not being
dogmatic in their choice of predictor. To see the impact that heterogeneity can have,
we compare large and small α cases.
We first note that it is possible to have situations in which there are multiple
equilibria with large α, but a unique equilibrium, with diverse beliefs, for small α.
To demonstrate this, adopt the Woodford calibration and the parameter settings in
Figure 1, and set φ = 0.45, σ2ν = 0.075. Figure 5 plots the bifurcation diagram for
various values of χpi and for both large and small α. The left plots show that with
large α there can be multiple equilibria. The right plots illustrate our findings that
when α takes a value less than or equal to three (the case α = 3 is shown), there
exists a unique equilibrium with Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
Finite values of α can also qualitatively affect a model with a unique equilibrium
under large α. Figure 6 parameterizes the model as above except σ2ν = 0.01 so that
there is a unique equilibrium at n = 1 for large α. With values of α < 3 there is a
unique equilibrium with agents distributed across both forecasting models.
4 Business Cycle and Policy Implications
Figures 3 and 4 have important business cycle and policy implications. This section
demonstrates two results: a bad luck story, with regime-switching output and inflation
variances, and the implications of heterogeneity for optimal monetary policy.
4.1 Bad luck
One widely cited empirical finding is that inflation and output volatility in the U.S.,
especially during the 1970’s, follows a regime-switching process alternating between
periods of high and low volatility (see Sims and Zha (2006)). Stock and Watson
(2003) present evidence that high inflation and output volatility during the 1970’s
coincided with a series of “bad luck” price shocks, e.g. high oil prices. This subsection
investigates whether bad luck, in the form of greater persistence and volatility of price
shocks, might lead to multiple equilibria and, under real-time learning and dynamic
predictor selection, endogenous volatility.
We consider the following experiment. We parameterize the model as in Figure
1, except that we set φ = 0.2 and σ2ν = 0.1. Then we imagine a “bad luck” structural
change in which the persistence and variance of the price shock ut increases via
the new parameter values φ = 0.5 and σ2ν = 0.4. For each of these two scenarios,
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Figure 7 exhibits the equilibrium properties for various values of the inflation response
coefficient χpi. The left-most panels of Figure 7 arise under the case of low price shock
variance while the right-most panels occur under the bad luck scenario. When price
shocks have low persistence and volatility, there is a unique equilibrium at n = 1 for
all values of χpi. If, on the other hand, there is an episode of bad luck then there are
multiple equilibria for values of χpi < 1.5. The bad luck economy, therefore, could be
in either a low volatility demand shock equilibrium or a high volatility price shock
equilibrium.
Figure 7 also shows that if policy is sufficiently aggressive in response to inflation,
i.e. χpi > 1.5, the economy with more volatile price shocks will possess a unique equi-
librium. This figure, therefore, captures two empirical features of the U.S. economy
First, bad luck can de-stabilize the economy in the sense that before the increase in
the volatility of price shocks there was a unique equilibrium and afterwards there are
multiple equilibria. Second, a monetary policy that responds strongly to expected
inflation is stabilizing by coordinating the economy on a unique equilibrium. This
second feature of Figure 7, the stabilizing effect of anti-inflationary policy, has often
been argued as a key component of the lower volatility during the mid-1980’s-1990’s.
The model here explains these phenomena by highlighting the role that monetary
policy and the stochastic properties of price shocks play as bifurcation parameters.
In Figure 7, the policymaker can ensure existence of a unique equilibrium at
n = 0 by making policy sufficiently aggressive against expected inflation. However,
in this particular numerical example stabilizing inflation comes at the expense of
greater output volatility. A policymaker who instead increases the response of nominal
interest rates to both inflation and output following a bad-luck episode can lead to
reasonable variance outcomes for both inflation and output volatility. For example,
following the bad luck episode in Figure 7 by setting χpi = 1.5, χx = 1.5 there is a
unique equilibrium at n = 0 and V ar(x) = V ar(pi) = 4.5.
The existence of multiple equilibria following a bad luck episode suggests that
under a real-time learning and dynamic predictor selection formulation of the model,
regime-switching output and inflation volatility might arise endogenously. We ex-
amine this possibility by turning to a real-time learning environment. In a Mis-
specification Equilibrium, agents’ expectations satisfy the least-squares orthogonality
conditions, where the expectation is taken with respect to population moments. We
now assume that rather than knowing these population moments, and hence the equi-
librium values for b1, b2 and the relative predictor fitness measure F , private-sector
agents infer their values in real-time from historical data. In particular, we assume
that agents use recursive least-squares to generate parameter estimates b1, b2 by re-
gressing the state yt on demand or price shocks, respectively. In deciding on which
forecasting model to adopt, they must also estimate the unconditional mean-square
forecast errors recursively and select the model that delivers the lowest estimated
squared forecast error.
Under real-time learning, the economy is generated by an actual law of motion
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with time-varying parameters:
yt = ξ1(b
1
t−1, nt−1)gt + ξ2(b
2
t−1, nt−1)ut
where b1t , b
2
t are updated by recursive least squares
b1t = b
1
t−1 + ηtR
−1
1t gt
(
yt − b
1
t−1gt
)
b2t = b
2
t−1 + ηtR
−1
2t ut
(
yt − b
2
t−1ut
)
R1t = R1t−1 + ηt
(
g2t −R1t−1
)
R2t = R2t−1 + ηt
(
u2t −R2t−1
)
.
ηt is a deterministic gain sequence such that
∑∞
t=0 ηt = +∞. Under recursive least
squares ηt = t
−1 is a decreasing gain and it is possible in many settings, including
ours, to show that parameter estimates converge (with probability 1) to their equi-
librium values. For the particular experiment under consideration, the n = 0, n = 1
restricted perceptions equilibria are locally stable under a decreasing gain learning
rule. Alternatively, ηt = η, with 0 < η < 1, is a constant gain version that assumes
agents discount past data. A constant gain learning rule is desirable in environments
in which agents may be concerned about structural change. After a bad luck struc-
tural change the economy may be in one of multiple equilibria, so an agent learning
about the parameters of their forecasting rule(s) would want to use a constant gain
algorithm to remain robust to the possibility of switching between equilibria.
In order to select a particular, recursively updated forecasting model, agents also
estimate the unconditional mean square forecast error for each model,
EU1t = EU
1
t−1 + δt
[(
yt − b
1
t−1ρgt
)2
− EU1t−1
]
EU2t = EU
2
t−1 + δt
[(
yt − b
2
t−1φut
)2
− EU2t−1
]
where δt is a gain sequence. Following Branch and Evans (2007) we allow δt 6= ηt so
that agents may be more or less concerned with structural change in predictor fitness
than in structural change in model parameters.
To illustrate the real-time learning and dynamic predictor selection dynamics we
turn to numerical simulations. We set ηt = 0.03, δt = 0.05, and adopt the parameter
values in Figure 7. We first initialize the model by simulating for 5000 periods, with
a decreasing gain, allowing the parameters to converge to their n = 1 equilibrium
values. Then we simulate the model for 8000 periods. The first 4000 periods the
economy will be in a good luck scenario with φ = 0.2, σ2ν = 0.1. Then at period 4001
the economy experiences a bad luck structural change with φ = 0.5, σ2ν = 0.4. Figure
8 plots a typical simulation.
The top panel of Figure 8 plots the predictor selection in real-time. Prior to
period 4000 there is a unique equilibrium, and so even under real-time learning agents
coordinate on the demand shock equilibrium. Following period 4000 there are multiple
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equilibria, and the dynamics of predictor selection switch between the demand and
supply shock equilibria as shocks to the system, filtered through agents’ learning
process, switch the economy between basins of attraction.
The bottom two panels of Figure 8 plots a 20 quarter moving average of inflation
and output volatility. Prior to period 4000 inflation and output variance are stable
and near their low volatility n = 1 equilibrium values. Following period 4000, as the
economy switches between demand and supply shock equilibria, output and inflation
variances fluctuate endogenously between high and low states.
The results in Figure 8 suggest one (possible) interpretation of the high volatility
periods in the U.S. as identified by Sims and Zha (2006). It has been argued, by
Stock and Watson (2003) among many others, that the bad luck supply shocks of
the 1970s can account for the high volatility of the 1970s and the subsequent period
of moderation following 1984. However, the standard New Keynesian model cannot
account for regime-switching volatilities unless the supply shock itself is assumed
to follow a regime-switching process. Figure 8 demonstrates that a standard New
Keynesian model adapted to incorporate a very reasonable model of expectation
formation, can lead to multiple equilibria when supply shocks shift to a new higher
variance process. The greater volatility of supply shocks has the indirect effect of
leading to the existence of multiple equilibria. Under real-time learning, as agents
update model parameters and select their models, the economy switches between high
and low volatility equilibria. Our account thus provides a bad luck explanation for
endogenous volatility. It is important to note that this endogenous volatility arises
regardless of whether policy satisfies the Taylor principle. Figure 7 shows that in the
bad luck scenario, multiple equilibria exist both for χpi below and above one.
4.2 A Calibrated Example
The previous subsection demonstrated that a bad luck episode can lead the economy
from a period of relative stability to unstable regime-switching dynamics. To fur-
ther elaborate on the model’s potential business cycle implications, this subsection
presents a brief calibration exercise. We choose values for the policy parameters and
shock processes in line with empirical estimates, simulate the model, and compare
the moments of the model to U.S. data.
An empirical finding that we seek to replicate is that U.S. business cycle dynam-
ics exhibit multiple regimes. As mentioned above, some attribute these regimes to
changes in the conduct and goals of monetary policy (e.g. Clarida et al. (1999))
and others to changes in the underlying structural shocks (e.g. Stock and Watson
(2003)). The results from the previous section suggest that regime-switching can arise
from a model in which agents select underparameterized forecasting models even if
there are no structural changes to policy or the shocks. This subsection explores
to what extent learning and dynamic predictor selection, without changes in mone-
tary policy or structural features of the economy, can be a plausible explanation for
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regime-switching business cycle dynamics.
We adopt the Woodford calibration assumed throughout the paper and addition-
ally set χpi = 1.01, χx = .125, ρ = .5, φ = .45, σε = 0.9, σν = 0.075. These parameter
values are consistent with empirical estimates presented in the literature. There is
some evidence that χpi < 1 during the 1970’s and χpi > 1 in subsequent periods. We
set χpi = 1.01 as a compromise between these findings and to be sure that the results
are not being driven by a failure to satisfy the Taylor principle. Estimates for ρ, φ
tend to be greater than these assumed values, but the calibrated values fall within a
typical 90% confidence set.
We simulate the model with learning and dynamic predictor selection. We adopt
the constant gains from the previous subsection: ηt = 0.03, δt = 0.05. We first
simulate the model for a transient 5000 periods, then simulate the model for 8000
periods, calculate moments from the simulated data, and then repeat 1000 times. We
then average the moments across simulations. Table 1 presents the results.
In Table 1 we report on the standard deviations of output, inflation, the con-
temporaneous correlation of output and inflation, and the persistence of inflation by
regime. The model parameterization chosen leads to the existence of multiple mis-
specification equilibria, with the n = 0, n = 1 equilibria stable under learning. With
constant gain learning, the economy switches between these equilibria as in Figure 8.
We calculate the moments within each n = 1 or n = 0 regime.
Table 1 compares the moments from the model with those from the data. There
have been several approaches to identifying regime change in U.S. data. One approach
is to assume a regime change after Volcker is appointed chairman of the Federal
Reserve, or at the time of the Great Moderation in 1984. We compare the moments
from the model across the two n = 0, n = 1 regimes to the moments from U.S. data
pre and post 1984.1. Similar results obtain for other approaches to identifying breaks
in the data. For each series the data have been detrended using the HP filter.
Table 1 demonstrates that the relative moments across regimes for the model and
for the data are an approximate match. In the data output and inflation volatility
drop by 53% and 72% while the model implies a reduction in volatility of 55% and
39%, respectively. Similarly, the model implies values for the contemporaneous cor-
relation and inflation persistence for the n = 1 regime very similar to that for the
data. On the other hand, the model does not deliver as well for these variables in the
n = 0 regime. The negative contemporaneous correlation in the n = 0 regime arises
because in this case the economy is driven primarily by supply shocks.
That the results in this simple model, in which agents select predictors in real time,
can deliver empirically plausible regime-switching dynamics, provides some support
for the misspecification approach advocated for in this paper. These results arise in a
calibrated model without change in the policy rule or the exogenous shocks. A more
realistic model would build in switching policy rules and stochastic volatility in the
exogenous shocks. We anticipate that results from such a model would improve the
fit over the simple case presented in this section.
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4.3 Optimal Discretionary Policy
Under a contemporaneous policy rule, there are many possible equilibrium outcomes.
A natural question then is what if policymakers were to conduct optimal discretionary
policy? To address this question, suppose that policymaker’s seek to minimize a
quadratic loss function,
E0
∑
t≥0
βt
(
ωx2t + pi
2
t
)
subject to the aggregate supply curve (2). Under discretion, it is possible to find a
nominal interest rate rule that implements the optimal discretionary policy and re-
sponds only to the fundamental shocks. This fundamentals based rule was shown by
Evans and Honkapohja (2003) to lead to an unstable (and indeterminate) rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. Under underparameterized beliefs it is possible to show that
the restricted perceptions equilibrium is also unstable when policy is formed via a
fundamentals-based rule. Instead, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) propose a rule that
responds to private sector expectations and the fundamental exogenous shocks. When
monetary policy responds directly to private-sector expectations, under least-squares
learning the temporary equilibrium outcomes will converge to a unique rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. The good economic properties of an expectations-based rule
have been established under the assumption of homogeneous expectations. This
subsection considers the properties of expectations-based rules under heterogeneous
expectations.
It is possible to show that a policy rule of the form
it = ς
−1Eˆxt+1 +
(
1 +
βκς−1
ω + κ2
)
Eˆtpit+1 +
κς−1
ω + κ2
ut + ς
−1gt
will implement optimal discretionary policy under misspecified beliefs. Furthermore,
taking the same parameterization as in Figure 1, Figure 9 plots the T-map. The
left-hand plots of Figure 9 give the case of the EH-rule that implements optimal
discretionary policy. This figure makes clear that the optimal policy rule coordinates
the economy on the n = 0 equilibrium. This result is expected because optimal policy
perfectly offsets demand shocks, leaving the economy only to depend on price shocks.
Because the economy is driven entirely by price shocks there is only one possible
equilibrium outcome: n = 0. Moreover, this equilibrium coincides with the optimal
discretionary rational expectations equilibrium.
The right-most plots consider the same parameter values, the same expectations
based rule, but where the policymakers do not directly respond to demand shocks gt.
In this case, there is a unique equilibrium where agents coordinate on the demand
shock model.
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4.4 Discussion of Related Literature
Although most monetary models rely on a representative agent structure, this paper
demonstrates that there are important implications for monetary policy and business
cycle dynamics from a model with heterogeneous expectations. Heterogeneity arises
in our model as the result of the interaction between the direct effect of shocks, the
indirect effect that arises through the self-referential features of the New Keynesian
model, and the policy feedback effect.
The endogeneity of heterogeneous beliefs is an important feature in other models
as well. For example, Branch and McGough (2011) study a neoclassical stochastic
growth model with agents distributed heterogeneously between rational and adaptive
agents, whose beliefs are pinned down by a restricted perceptions equilibrium. Kurz
and Motolese (2011) and Guo et al. (2011) demonstrate that diverse beliefs can have
important implications for asset pricing and asset returns. These latter two papers
adopt the Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) approach of Kurz (1994). The RBE
methodology emphasizes that beliefs are a component of the state of the economy,
and in equilibrium the empirical distribution of the economy must align itself with
the beliefs of the agents. In Kurz et al. (2005), it is shown that a model with RBE
can significantly improve the empirical fit of monetary business cycle models.
Closely related to this paper is De Grauwe (2011) who introduces heterogeneous
beliefs into a New Keynesian model. In his model, there are two types of agents,
optimists and pessimists. The diversity of their opinion is increasing with the output
gap. DeGrauwe shows that the positive feedback of the New Keynesian model will
lead agents to coordinate on a particular model, leading to endogenous boom-bust
dynamics. The importance of positive vs. negative feedback for the way in which het-
erogeneous expectations arise in our setting has also been emphasized in our earlier
work. In an eductive setting the closely related role of complementarity vs. substi-
tutability is shown by Guesnerie and Jara-Moroni (2011) to play a pivotal role in
expectational coordination.2
A key aspect to the present paper is that agents adopt heterogeneous forecast-
ing models. We motivated this assumption by highlighting an empirical literature
that finds evidence of heterogeneous expectations. Wieland and Wolters (2011) also
demonstrates that the model implied forecasts can vary significantly from one es-
timated DSGE model to the next. It would be interesting for future research to
consider misspecification equilibria when agents adopt forecasts from misspecified
DSGE models.3
2This is also seen in the experimental results of Fehr and Tyran (2008).
3For a related approach in an estimated DSGE model, see Slobodyan and Wouters (2007).
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5 Conclusion
Most of the literature on monetary policy adheres to the assumption of rational ex-
pectations, in which agents have homogeneous expectations. Recent studies of the
implications for monetary policy of private agents following adaptive learning rules
have for the most part maintained the assumption of homogeneous expectations.
However, we know from surveys that heterogeneous beliefs are a salient feature of the
data. In our framework, heterogeneous expectations arise naturally because agents
adopt one of several competing forecasting models, with the distribution of agents
across predictors reflecting the relative success of the alternative forecast rules. In
some cases heterogeneity exists even in the limit when agents select only the best pre-
dictors. This can arise in particular when monetary policy responds very aggressively
to expected output or inflation.
Our framework has turned up new phenomena. Multiple equilibria is possible
even when there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium that is stable under
least-squares learning. In particular, bad luck in the form of greater persistence and
volatility of price shocks, such as occurred in the 1970s, could push the economy from
a unique equilibrium to a situation with multiple equilibria. Under real-time learning
and dynamic predictor selection the economy would exhibit endogenous volatility.
Increasing the policy response to inflation in the Taylor rule, as arguably occurred in
the mid 1980s, can eliminate the endogenous volatility.
We also examined optimal discretionary monetary policy, looking in particular
at an expectations based-rule known to have good properties under least-squares
learning. We found that this rule, designed to respond explicitly to private-sector
expectations, continues to perform well in our set-up in the presence of heterogenous
expectations. It would be of interest to examine the generality of this finding and to
extend the investigation to rules with history dependence of the type discussed in the
literature on optimal policy with commitment.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1.Computing the determinant and inserting r = r˜ = ρ =
φ = 0 we obtain
det(∆) = (1 + χx(1− n)ς + χpi(1− n)ςκ) (1 + nχxς + nχxςκ) .
Since det(∆) ≥ 1, the result follows by continuity.
Proof of proposition 4. The reduced-form matrix expressions for A,B,D are
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A =
(
1 ς
κ β + κς
)
B =
(
−χxς −χpiς
−χxκς −χpiκς
)
D =
(
1 0
κ 1
)
.
Since b1 = ξ1 and b
2 = ξ2 when r, r˜ → 0 it follows that ξ1(0) = (1, κ)
′,
ξ2(0) =
(
ς(φ−χpi)
1+ς(χx+κχpi)−φ((1+β+ς(βχx+κ)+βφ)
1+ςχx−φ
1+ς(χx+κχpi)−φ((1+β+ς(βχx+κ)+βφ)
)
.
Similarly, ξ2(1) = (0, 1)
′ and
ξ1(1) =
(
1−βρ
1+βρ2+ς(χx+κχpi)−ρ(1+β+ς(βχx+κ))
κ
1+βρ2+ς(χx+κχpi)−ρ(1+β+ς(βχx+κ))
)
.
Evaluating F (0) and F (1) at the above values for ξ1, ξ2, it can be seen that
F (0) < 0⇔
σ2ν
σ2ε
> B0
F (1) < 0⇔
σ2ν
σ2ε
> B1,
from which the result follows.
Proof of proposition 5. For result 1, it is straightforward to see that limχpi→∞B1 =
limχx→∞B1 = 0. Moreover, using l’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
χpi→∞
B0 =
ρ2(1− φ2)(1 + κ2)κ2
φ2(1− ρ2)
, and
lim
χx→∞
B0 =
ρ2(1− φ2)(1 + κ2)(1− βφ)2
φ2(1− ρ2)
.
The result follows. Result 2 follows since P0 must hold for σ
2
ν
σ2
ε
sufficiently large.
Similarly Result 3 follows since P1 must hold for σ
2
ν
σ2
ε
sufficiently small.
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Table 1: Business Cycle Calibration. Standard deviation in percent of log
real GDP, y, and inflation is calculated from the implicit price deflator. Data
have been HP-detrended.
n = 0 n = 1 1960.1-1983.4 1984.1-2009.2
σy 2.32 1.04 2.00 0.932
σpi 0.70 0.429 0.91 0.25
Inflation persistence 0.37 0.38 0.92 0.45
corr(y, pi) -0.745 .081 0.012 0.26
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Figure 1: Multiple equilibria.
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Figure 2: Intrinsic Heterogeneity.
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram: multiple equilibria.
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram: intrinsic heterogeneity.
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Figure 5: Bifurcation diagram: large versus small α.
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Figure 6: Misspecification Equilibria for large and small α.
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Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram: bad luck.
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Figure 8: Bad luck and endogenous volatility.
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Figure 9: Optimal discretionary policy and expectations-based rules.
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